

## Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

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O R 121645Z MAY 78  
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1454  
INFO AMEMBASSY RABAT  
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS  
AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT

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DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/AFN BISHOP

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1  
TAGS: PEPR, FR, AG, MO, MR  
SUBJ: NORTH AFRICAN POLICY REVIEW

REFS: A. ALGIERS 1341. B. RABAT 2462.

BEGIN SUMMARY: THE FRENCH HAVE SPECIAL INTERESTS AND OBLIGATIONS IN NORTH AFRICA THE STABILITY OF WHICH THEY REGARD AS OF MAJOR STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE. AN IMPORTANT REASON FOR THE LIMITED FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MAURITANIA WAS TO AVOID THE MAJOR DESTABILIZATION WHICH THE GOF BELIEVES WOULD STEM FROM THE INSTALLATION OF A PRO-ALGERIAN REGIME IN NOUAKCHOTT AND THE RESULTING ISOLATION OF MOROCCO. THIS EFFORT AT STABILIZATION HAS BEEN AT THE COST OF ANOTHER IMPORTANT GOAL, THAT OF IMPROVING FRENCH-ALGERIAN RELATIONS WHICH THE SAHARAN CONFLICT HAS BROUGHT TO A LOW EBB. DESPITE

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BOUMEDIENE'S CONTINUED COMMITMENT TO THE POLISARIO, THE GOF PERSISTS IN EFFORTS TO IMPROVE RELATIONS, MOST RECENTLY BY A PROPOSAL TO SEPARATE THE SAHARAN QUESTION FROM THE REST OF FRENCH-ALGERIAN RELATIONS. WHILE CURRENTLY STALLED, THE FRENCH ARE CAUTIOUSLY HOPEFUL THAT THE EFFORT MAY BEAR FRUIT. IN THE MEANTIME, THE FRENCH ARE CONCERNED THAT ALGERIA MIGHT

SUCCESSFULLY PLAY OFF FRANCE AGAINST ITS OTHER WESTERN ALLIES, PARTICULARLY THE US. WE HAVE REASSURED THE FRENCH IN THIS REGARD AND SHOULD CONTINUE TO CONSULT ON DEVELOPMENTS IN OUR RELATIONS WITH THE ALGERIANS BOTH TO AVOID MISUNDERSTANDING AND TO ENSURE THAT WE DO NOT IMPEDE FRENCH EFFORTS AT IMPROVING RELATIONS--A DEVELOPMENT WHICH WOULD BE MANIFESTLY IN THE WESTERN INTEREST. IF WE ARE NOT ALREADY DOING SO, WE SHOULD CONSIDER CONSULTING WITH THE FRENCH ON OUR RESPECTIVE EFFORTS TO BUILD UP THE MOROCCAN DEFENSIVE CAPABILITY WHICH COULD, FOR INSTANCE, AVOID WASTEFUL DUPLICATION OF EFFORT AND COMPETITION FOR SCARCE HUMAN RESOURCES. IT MIGHT BE USEFUL TO POOL IDEAS ON POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THE INTRACTABLE SAHARA PROBLEM AND IN ANY EFFORTS WE UNDERTAKE ON OUR OWN (SUCH AS PURSUING THE ALGERIAN MEDIATION IDEA) WE SHOULD BE CAREFUL NOT TO PUT OURSELVES IN THE AWKWARD POSITION OF SEEMING TO MEDIATE BETWEEN THE FRENCH AND ALGERIANS. WHILE WE THUS RECOMMEND AN EXPANDED EXCHANGE OF VIEWS WITH THE FRENCH, WE DO NOT FAVOR FORMAL CONSULTATIONS ON NORTH AFRICA AS A WHOLE. TO DO SO WOULD BE TO INVITE ADDITIONAL PRESSURE FROM THE FRENCH IN FAVOR OF POSITIONS WHICH FOR CONGRESSIONAL AND OTHER CONSIDERATIONS WE HAVE DETERMINED TO BE IMPRACTICAL. THE FRENCH COULD ALSO MAKE A VERY PERSUASIVE CASE IN SUCH CONSULTATIONS THAT THEY ARE SHORING UP WESTERN INTERESTS.

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ESTS AT SOME COST TO THEMSELVES AND THEREFORE SHOULD BE COMPENSATED IN SOME FASHION. IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES, WE MIGHT FIND IT AWKWARD TO RESIST PROPOSALS WHICH WOULD LIMIT OUR FREEDOM OF ACTION IN SUCH AREAS AS THE IMPROVEMENT OF RELATIONS WITH THE ALGERIANS.

END SUMMARY.

1. FRENCH VIEWS AND POLICIES IN NORTHWEST AFRICA SHOULD BE TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION IN REVIEWING U.S. POLICY TOWARDS THE AREA TO ENHANCE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF OUR OWN POLICY AND TO AVOID NEEDLESS COMPLICATIONS IN OUR RELATIONS WITH AN IMPORTANT EUROPEAN ALLY. WHILE FRENCH ATTITUDES TOWARDS NORTH AFRICA ARE NO LONGER ENCUMBERED WITH MUCH OF THE BAGGAGE OF THE EARLY POST-COLONIAL PERIOD, THERE REMAINS A BELIEF THAT FRANCE HAS A SPECIAL VOCATION IN THE AREA. THE REASONS INCLUDE HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL TIES, GEOGRAPHIC PROXIMITY, ECONOMIC SELF-INTEREST, AND A SENSE OF OBLIGATION STEMMING FROM FORMER INVOLVEMENT. FRENCH OFFICIALS NO LONGER REGARD THE AREA AS A SPECIAL

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AMEMBASSY ALGIERS  
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PRESERVE, BUT THEY WOULD EXPECT THEIR FRIENDS AND  
ALLIES TO TAKE FRANCE'S SPECIAL POSITION INTO ACCOUNT.

2. THE OVERRIDING FRENCH CONCERN IN NORTHWEST AFRICA  
IS FOR STABILITY AND THE AVOIDANCE OF CONFLICT. A  
POSTULATE OF FRENCH AFRICAN POLICY IS THAT IN CONDI-  
TIONS OF PEACE AND STABILITY FRENCH AND WESTERN INTER-  
ESTS WILL BE ALMOST AUTOMATICALLY ADVANCED AS  
COUNTRIES CONCENTRATE ON DEVELOPMENT SINCE THE DESIRE  
FOR WESTERN AID, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE, AND TECHNOLOGY  
WILL GENERALLY BE MORE POWERFUL THAN IDEOLOGICAL CON-  
SIDERATIONS. AT THE SAME TIME, THE FRENCH BELIEVE IN  
TRYING TO MAINTAIN THE BEST POSSIBLE RELATIONS WITH  
WHATEVER GOVERNMENT IS IN POWER, DESPITE POSSIBLE  
IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES.

3. THE FRENCH SEE THEIR LIMITED MILITARY INVOLVEMENT  
IN MAURITANIA AS CONSISTENT WITH THIS DESIRE FOR PEACE  
AND STABILITY. WHILE NOT IGNORING THE ETHNIC, TRIBAL,  
AND OTHER COMPLEXITIES OF THE SAHARA PROBLEM, FRENCH  
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POLICY AIMS AT DEALING WITH ITS ESSENTIAL ASPECTS WHICH THEY SEE AS RELATED TO BOUMEDIENE'S AMBITION TO MAKE ALGERIA A POWER IN THE SAHARAN REGION AND HIS RIVALRY WITH HASSAN. IN THIS VIEW, ALGERIAN SUPPORT FOR THE POLISARIO AIMS AT BRINGING A PRO-ALGERIAN GOVERNMENT TO POWER IN NOUAKCHOTT. (THIS AIM MIGHT BE SATISFIED WITH A SWITCH IN ALLEGIANCE OF THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT FROM MOROCCO TO ALGERIA.) A CHANGE OF THIS NATURE WOULD LEAVE MOROCCO ISOLATED AND WEAKENED AND ALGERIA RELATIVELY STRENGTHENED BOTH IN THE REGION AS A WHOLE AND VIS-A-VIS MOROCCO. THIS WOULD GREATLY INCREASE INSTABILITY IN THE REGION AND POSSIBLY UP THE CHANCES OF WAR BETWEEN ALGERIA AND MOROCCO. WE BELIEVE THAT A CALCULATION ALONG THIS LINE FIGURED PROMINENTLY IN THE FRENCH DECISION TO ENGAGE ITS AIR POWER IN MAURITANIA.

4. THE DECISION TO INTERVENE WAS ALSO BASED ON OTHER LESS THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS. FRANCE HAS MAJOR ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN MAURITANIA (AND SOME 2000 OF ITS CITIZENS) LARGELY CONCENTRATED IN THE REGION MOST OPEN TO POLISARIO ACTIVITY. FRANCE'S MODERATE BLACK AFRICAN FRIENDS SUCH AS SENEGAL TEND TO REGARD THE POLISARIO THREAT TO MAURITANIA AS ONE MORE EXAMPLE OF SOVIET-BACKED OR SPONSORED SUBVERSION OF AFRICAN REGIMES AND LOOK TO FRANCE TO DEMONSTRATE ITS SOLIDARITY WITH ITS FRIENDS. (THIS SAME FACTOR HAS INFLUENCED FRENCH ACTIONS IN CHAD AND ZAIRE.) FRANCE HAS A MILITARY COOPERATION AGREEMENT WITH MAURITANIA WHICH IMPOSES CERTAIN OBLIGATIONS (THOUGH THE PREVIOUS AGREEMENT BINDING FRANCE TO ACTIVE MILITARY INTERVENTION WAS ABROGATED BY MUKHTAR SEVERAL YEARS AGO). AND, OF COURSE, THERE IS THE DESIRE TO SUPPORT THE FRIENDLY REGIME IN SECRET

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MOROCCO.

5. THE GOF HAS LIMITED EXPECTATIONS OF WHAT IT CAN DO IN MAURITANIA. ESSENTIALLY IT HOPES THAT, IN COOPERATION WITH MOROCCO, IT WILL BE ABLE TO GIVE MAURITANIA A BREATHING SPACE IN WHICH FRENCH AND OTHER ASSISTANCE MIGHT BUILD UP ITS ARMED FORCES TO THE POINT WHERE IT CAN DEFEND ITSELF. THIS WILL TAKE YEARS. THERE IS ALSO THE HOPE THAT BOUMEDIENE WILL FIND HIS SAHARAN ADVENTURE TOO COSTLY. IN THE MEANTIME, THE FRENCH DIRECT MILITARY INVOLVEMENT WILL BE KEPT TO THE MINIMUM AND PROBABLY IN A FORM WHICH CAN CONTINUE TO BE JUSTIFIED AS PROTECTING FRENCH CITIZENS.

6. ON THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE FORMER SPANISH SAHARA, THE FRENCH POSITION IS SIMILAR TO THAT OF THE U.S.: THEY VOTED IN THE UN FOR SELF-DETERMINATION FOR THE SAHARAN PEOPLES AND ARE NEUTRAL ON THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THIS HAS ALREADY BEEN ACCOMPLISHED BY CONSULTATIONS, OR WHETHER FURTHER STEPS ARE NECESSARY. WHILE THEY TAKE NO PUBLIC POSITION, THERE IS A CONSENSUS AMONG FRENCH OFFICIALS THAT A PLEBISCITE WOULD NOW BE MEANINGLESS IN VIEW OF DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGES WHICH HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN THE REGION SINCE THE DEPARTURE OF THE SPANISH. THE AMBIGUOUS LEGAL POSITION OF THE FORMER SPANISH SAHARA IS NOT AN IMPEDIMENT TO FRENCH PROGRAMS OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO MOROCCO AND MAURITANIA.

7. FRENCH SUPPORT FOR MAURITANIA IN THE CAUSE OF STABILITY CONFLICTS WITH ANOTHER IMPORTANT FRENCH OBJECTIVE: GOOD RELATIONS WITH ALGERIA. THESE RELATIONS

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TROUBLED SINCE INDEPENDENCE, HAVE FALLEN TO A NEW LOW IN THE PAST YEAR AND A HALF. GISCARD'S 1975 VISIT TO ALGERIA WAS SUPPOSED TO MARK THE BEGINNING OF A NEW ERA. IT DID NOT BECAUSE OF THE SAHARA FIGHTING AND PERHAPS ALSO BECAUSE OF A LACK OF PERSONAL RAPPORT BETWEEN GISCARD AND BOUMEDIENE; TWO MORE DIFFERENT CHARACTERS ARE HARD TO VISUALIZE. DESPITE FAILURES TO DATE, FRANCE HAS NOT GIVEN UP ON THE ATTEMPT TO

IMPROVE RELATIONS. FRANCE HAS REFUSED TO ENGAGE IN A WAR OF POLEMICS AND HAS NOT RETALIATED AGAINST ECONOMIC PRESSURES FROM ALGERIA. ALGERIA STILL GETS THE LARGEST SINGLE PIECE OF THE FRENCH TECHNICAL COOPERATION BUDGET AND WHILE FRANCE IGNORED REQUESTS TO RAISE THE NUMBER OF COOPERANTS IN ALGERIA, IT HAS NOT BEEN REDUCED. EVEN IN THIS TIME OF STRAINED RELATIONS PERHAPS AS MANY AS HALF A DOZEN MINISTERIAL-LEVEL OFFICIALS HAVE BEEN SENT TO ALGERIA WITHOUT ALGERIA RECIPROCATING.

8. IN THE FACE OF BOUMEDIENE'S DETERMINATION TO CON-  
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TINUE SUPPORT FOR THE POLISARIO, THE GOF HAS TRIED SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE YEAR TO SEPARATE THE SAHARA PROBLEM FROM THE TOTALITY OF FRENCH-ALGERIAN RELATIONS. THIS WAS THE THRUST OF GISCARD'S PROPOSAL TO ESTABLISH A NEW BASIS FOR FRENCH-ALGERIAN RELATIONS. THE INITIAL ALGERIAN RESPONSE WAS NEUTRAL, BUT THE GOF HAD NOT EXPECTED MORE UNTIL AFTER THE MARCH NATIONAL ELECTIONS, SINCE THE OPPOSITION SOCIALISTS AND COMMUNISTS WERE MAKING IMPROVEMENT OF RELATIONS WITH ALGERIA A MINOR CAMPAIGN ISSUE. WARM CONGRATULATORY MESSAGES TO PRIME MINISTER BARRE AND FONMIN DE GUIRINGAUD AFTER THE ELECTIONS WERE TAKEN AS A SIGNAL THAT ALGERIA MIGHT BE READY TO TALK SERIOUSLY. TALKS WERE JUST ABOUT TO GET OFF THE GROUND WHEN STEPPED UP FRENCH INTERVENTION IN CHAD AND LATER A NEW AERIAL INTERVENTION IN MAURITANIA CAUSED ALGERIA TO LASH OUT AGAIN AT FRENCH NEOCOLONIALIST ASPIRATIONS. THE GOF HAS BEEN PLAYING A PATIENT GAME AND HOPES THE LATEST STORM WILL BLOW OVER AND SERIOUS DISCUSSIONS BECOME POSSIBLE SOON. THIS HOPE IS FED BY GROWING SIGNS THAT ALL IS NOT WELL WITHIN ALGERIA AND THAT SOME RETHINKING OF A POLICY OF HOSTILITY TOWARDS FRANCE MAY BE TAKING PLACE.

9. FRENCH CONCERN OVER ALGERIAN EFFORTS TO SHIFT COMMERCIAL OPPORTUNITIES FROM TRADITIONAL FRENCH SUPPLIERS TO US AND OTHER WESTERN SOURCES GOES BEYOND THE QUESTION OF LOSS OF BUSINESS. CONVINCED THAT THE ALGERIANS HAVE NO DESIRE TO MAKE THEMSELVES COMPLETELY DEPENDENT ON THE SOVIETS AND THAT THEY WANT AND NEED WESTERN TECHNOLOGY, THE FRENCH ARE WORRIED THAT THE ALGERIANS MIGHT SUCCESSFULLY PLAY WESTERN COUNTRIES (ESPECIALLY THE US AND FRANCE) OFF AGAINST ONE ANOTHER.  
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HIGH-LEVEL U.S. ASSURANCES THAT WE HAVE NO INTENTION OF BEING USED BY THE ALGERIANS TO FRANCE'S DETRIMENT AND A CONTINUING EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON NORTH AFRICAN QUESTIONS HAVE PROBABLY EASED FRENCH CONCERNS. EVEN IF WE WANTED TO, WE CANNOT PREVENT US FIRMS FROM PROFITING FROM FRENCH DISCOMFITURE. THIS FACT ARGUES FOR CONTINUED CLOSE CONSULTATION ON ALGERIAN MATTERS.

10. FRENCH-MOROCCAN RELATIONS ARE GOOD AND RELATIVELY UNCOMPLICATED. THE PERSONAL RAPPORT LACKING BETWEEN GISCARD AND BOUMEDIENE IS PRESENT WITH HASSAN. FRENCH OFFICIALS, ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS, HAVE EXPRESSED DISQUIET OVER THE MILITARY IMBALANCE IN FAVOR OF ALGERIA. THE GOF HAS A CONTINUING PROGRAM OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE WHICH WE UNDERSTAND INCLUDES CROTALE MISSILES, FOUGA ATTACK AIRCRAFT, MIRAGE F-1S, ALPHA JETS OTHER MILITARY EQUIPMENT, AND TRAINING. THE FRENCH WERE CLEARLY DISAPPOINTED THAT WE WERE UNABLE TO SELL MOROCCO THE REQUESTED OV-10 AIRCRAFT AND COBRA HELICOPTERS. (FRENCH AIR FORCE EXPERTS PROBABLY PERSUADED THE MOROCCANS THAT THE OV-10 WAS THE AIRCRAFT BEST SUITED TO THEIR NEEDS IN THE SAHARA.) AFTER SOME INITIAL UNCERTAINTY THEY HAVE BEEN REASSURED THAT WE WILL CONTINUE OUR TRADITIONAL PROGRAM OF MILITARY COOPERATION WITH MOROCCO. THEY PROBABLY WISH THAT WE WOULD DO MORE. IF SUCH COORDINATION DOES NOT ALREADY EXIST IN RABAT, WE THINK THAT IT WOULD BE A GOOD IDEA TO DISCUSS WITH THE FRENCH HOW OUR TWO ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS CAN BEST COMPLEMENT EACH OTHER IN ORDER TO IMPROVE THE READINESS OF MOROCCAN FORCES IN THE SHORTEST POSSIBLE TIME. SUCH CONSULTATION MIGHT,

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INFO AMEMBASSY RABAT  
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS  
AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT

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FOR INSTANCE, AVOID DUPLICATION OF EFFORT AND COMPETITION FOR WHAT WE PRESUME ARE LIMITED HUMAN RESOURCES.

11. ON THE SUBJECT OF THE NOW APPARENTLY DORMANT ALGERIAN IDEA OF AN AMERICAN MEDIATION OF THE SAHARA DISPUTE, WE ARE ONLY MARGINALLY IN A POSITION TO COMMENT, BUT THINK A CAUTIONARY NOTE IN ORDER. THE FRENCH ARE PURSUING A POLICY IN NORTH AFRICA WHICH IS AT SOME COST TO THEIR IMMEDIATE INTERESTS. THEY HAVE NOT EMBARKED ON THIS POLICY LIGHTLY AND WOULD FIND IT INCONGRUOUS AND PROBABLY UNACCEPTABLE IF US MEDIATION OF THE SAHARA DISPUTE WERE TO PUT US IN THE POSITION OF MEDIATING BETWEEN FRANCE AND ALGERIA.

12. WHILE FOR THE REASONS NOTED ABOVE WE THINK THAT IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE HAVE AN EXPANDED EXCHANGE OF VIEWS WITH THE FRENCH ON VARIOUS ASPECTS OF THE NORTH AFRICAN SITUATION, WE HAVE RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE DESIRABILITY OF FORMALIZED CONSULTATIONS TO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEMS OF THE REGION AS A WHOLE. IN SUCH CON-  
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SULTATIONS THE FRENCH WOULD PROBABLY EMERGE AS STRONG SUPPORTERS OF THE MOROCCANS ON THE SUBJECTS OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND GENERAL POLITICAL SUPPORT (THOUGH NOT ON THE ISSUE OF SOVEREIGNTY IN THE FORMER SPANISH SAHARA; THE FRENCH UNDERSTAND OUR POSITION.) WE HAVE SUFFICIENT DIFFICULTIES IN JUSTIFYING CERTAIN OF OUR POSITIONS TO THE MOROCCANS WITHOUT HAVING TO GO THROUGH THE EXERCISE AGAIN WITH THE FRENCH. MOREOVER, THERE IS PROBABLY SOME ADVANTAGE IN MAKING DECISIONS RELATIVE TO THE STATES OF NORTH AFRICA WITHOUT CONSIDERATIONS RELATIVE TO OUR RELATIONS WITH FRANCE BEING NEEDLESSLY THROWN ON THE BALANCE. IT ALSO STRIKES US THAT IF THE MOROCCANS WERE TO LEARN OF THE CONSULTATIONS THEY MIGHT DECIDE TO DEFER ACCEPTANCE OF THE UNPALATABLE WHILE THE FRENCH ARGUE THEIR CASE. AND WE HAVE NO DOUBT THAT THE FRENCH COULD PUT FORWARD SOME VERY STRONG ARGUMENTS ON A NUMBER OF SUBJECTS. THEY COULD, FOR INSTANCE, ARGUE VERY PER-



SUASIVELY THAT THEIR ACTIONS IN NORTH AFRICA ARE UNDERTAKEN FOR THE GENERAL WESTERN INTEREST AT SOME COST TO FRANCE AND THAT THERE OUGHT THEREFORE TO BE SOME FORM OF COMPENSATION, POLITICAL OR OTHERWISE. FINALLY, WHILE WE BELIEVE STRONGLY THAT WE SHOULD TALK FREQUENTLY AND FRANKLY WITH THE FRENCH ABOUT WHAT WE ARE DOING IN ALGERIA WE SHOULD NOT PUT OURSELVES INTO A POSITION WHERE OUR FREEDOM TO ACT AS WE SEE FIT IS LIMITED OR TIED TO EXTRANEIOUS FACTORS.

13. IN CONCLUSION, WHILE WE DO NOT FAVOR FORMAL BROAD-GUAGE CONSULTATIONS ON NORTH AFRICA, WE DO RECOMMEND A MORE EXTENSIVE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION. IT IS IMPORTANT, FOR INSTANCE, THAT WE KEEP THE GOF WELL-INFORMED ON DEVELOPMENTS IN OUR RELATIONS WITH  
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ALGERIA TO AVOID GIVING THE IMPRESSION WE ARE BEING USED BY THE ALGERIANS OR THE SUSPICION THAT WE ARE PROFITING FROM FRANCE'S DIFFICULTIES IN ORDER TO IMPROVE OUR OWN COMMERCIAL AND POLITICAL POSITION. WE SHOULD ALSO AVOID STEPS WHICH WOULD NEEDLESSLY HAMPER FRANCE'S EFFORTS TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH ALGERIA--SOMETHING MANIFESTLY IN THE WESTERN INTEREST. WE COULD USEFULLY DISCUSS WITH THE FRENCH HOW BEST TO ENSURE THAT MOROCCO HAS THE MEANS OF DEFENDING ITSELF AND PERHAPS ALSO HOW TO SPARE THE MOROCCANS THE TEMPTATION OF MILITARY ADVENTURISM. WE SHOULD CONSIDER POOLING OUR THOUGHTS WITH THE FRENCH (AND PERHAPS THE SPANISH) ON POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THE SAHARA PROBLEM. ANY EFFORTS WE UNDERTAKE ON OUR OWN SHOULD, IN ANY CASE, TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THE FRENCH VIEW AND (AS IN THE CASE OF A POSSIBLE MEDIATION) WE SHOULD AVOID PUTTING OURSELVES BETWEEN THE FRENCH AND THE ALGERIANS.  
HARTMAN

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## Message Attributes

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